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ABSTRACT
Time plays a central role in Max Frisch’s Homo faber. Reading the autobio-
graphic entries that comprise the novel necessitates navigating a convoluted tem-
poral structure. In addition, the literary and cinematographic representations,
which Walter Faber, the technocratic hero of the novel, obsessively produces, con-
stitute an attempt to arrest the passage of time in the mechanically-produced image
and word. Allusions to the Biblical «Garden of Eden», the Oedipus myth, and clas-
sical art and antiquity further complicate the temporal structure of the novel. Most
importantly, the novel suggests that Faber is actually incapable of understanding
life or death because he lacks an authentic relationship to time. This becomes sig-
nificant because Faber pens the narrative of the novel from the hospital room in
which in he awaits news of his impending death. Therein lies the problem: How
can a man with no relationship to time face his own mortality? The answer offered
here is that Faber must give birth to himself as a human being in time. The fol-
lowing essay addresses this possibility by focusing on two complexes of «falls» (i.
e., «Zufall» «Fall» and «Unfall»), which begin and end the «First Station» of the
novel. The first complex throws Faber into a primeval, conflated, «Eden-like» tem-
porality; the second complex features Faber’s «fall» from this original (pre)tempo-
rality into the discrete, limited, linear temporality characteristic of human experi-
ence. Thus, in the «Second Station» of the novel, Faber emerges as a human,
senscient being able to face the inevitability of his death and the reality of his life
in time. 
Near the beginning of Max Frisch’s Homo faber, in the desert near
Tamaulipas, Faber insists: «Ich bin Techniker, und gewohnt, die Dinge zu
sehen, wie sie sind» (25). If Faber indeed sees things as they are, why do
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representational media, and indeed representation itself, play such an impor-
tant role in his life? It would seem that Faber, in fact, takes every measure
possible to mediate his vision of the world, transforming it through the filter-
ing eye of his camera into a technologically biased view of reality. Similarly,
every experience in the novel is mediated by a technical hand. As he sits in
the hospital in Athens at the beginning of the second station of the novel, he
bemoans the fact that they have taken his precious «Hermes-Baby»: «Ich
solle von Hand schreiben! Ich kann Handschrift nicht leiden [...]» (175). As
Walter Jens notes: «Schon daß der Techniker Faber überhaupt schreibt,
erscheint wie ein Widerspruch in sich selbst» (qtd. Schmitz, 224)1. It seems
that Faber’s insistence, that he is used to seeing things as they are, could not
be more untrue – Faber transforms every human sense impression into a tech-
nologized image incapable of threatening his notion of a mechanical world.
Faber uses technology to inoculate himself against reality by transforming
every human sense impression into an inert technologized representation. 
However, this is not where Faber’s interest in representation ends: though
he expresses a complete disdain for art in general, he falls in love exclusive-
ly with women, who are passionate about art. More specifically, he falls in
love with women whose primary artistic interest revolves around antiquity,
and even patiently accompanies Sabeth on a tour through Italy and Greece of
the most important relics of classical art. When Faber makes small talk with
Hanna in her apartment, inquiring about her work, Hanna, the archeologist,
replies: «Ich kleistere die Vergangenheit zusammen» (149). In other words,
she transforms time into space: she transforms the past into an object. Simi-
larly, the artistic manifestations of antiquity, about which Sabeth is so pas-
sionate, also embody a temporal objectification of sorts – they manifest the
past in the present, thus transforming a temporal progression into an object in
space. 
This transformation of time into space offers some insight into why rep-
resentation seems so necessary to Faber. As the Techniker, who accepts real-
ity «as it is», Faber would seemingly have no use for representation – that is
if he could accept the true nature of reality, and the true nature of himself, not
as a machine, but as a human being, subject to the passage and ravages of
time. However, this is not the case. As Hanna astutely points out, technology
is a trick that Faber uses to insulate himself against the world. Technology
allows him to live life without experiencing it by suggesting that life without
death is possible. As Faber recounts the conversation between Hanna and
him: «Mein Irrtum: daß wir Techniker versuchen, ohne den Tod zu leben.
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1 Originally from Walter Jens. «Max Frisch und der homo faber». Die Zeit 9 Jan. 1958. 
Wörtlich: Du behandelst das Leben nicht als Gestalt, sondern als bloße Addi-
tion, daher kein Verhältnis zur Zeit, weil kein Verhältnis zum Tod. Leben sei
Gestalt in der Zeit» (184). As a «Techniker» Faber attempts to live life as if
he were not mortal – as if he would never die. The only way to avoid the real-
ity of death is to avoid the reality of linear, finite, human time, because,
according to Hanna, life is a shape in time. 
Interestingly, Hanna defines life via the artistically-charged word,
«Gestalt». As previously discussed, Faber loves women who transform time
into space through art. On closer examination, his own pseudo-artistic pur-
suits, i. e., film-making and writing, can be seen as more than just a means
of distancing himself from the realities of life and death — by mediating life
through technological apparatuses, they also embody Faber’s own attempts to
transform time into space. Faber’s writing, the context in which the entire
novel is narrated, produces a convoluted temporality, which, at times, simul-
taneously expresses a past, present, and future. Thus, through his writing,
Faber is able to avoid the reality of time, by transforming a linear temporal
structure into the atemporalized object of his writing. Though the filming of
his surroundings would not necessarily serve to detemporalize time, the way
his film work is described expresses a similar breach of temporality. As Faber
sees his films for the first – and, incidentally, only time – in Düsseldorf, he
comments: «ich staunte, wieviel Sonnenuntergänge, drei Sonnenuntergänge
allein in der Wüste von Tamaulipas, man hätte meinen können, ich reise als
Vertreter von Sonnenuntergängen [...]» (202). It is not likely accidental that
Faber’s filmic object of choice is itself a most basic image of passing time:
the sunset, the transition between day and night, transformed by film into an
objectified image. As the film progresses to Italy, and the subject of his film
is Sabeth instead of sunsets, Faber contemplates the unreal feeling of seeing
the deceased alive and well on film: «Ihre Hände, die es nirgends mehr gibt
[...] ihre Arme, die es nirgends mehr gibt – [...] Ihr Lachen, das ich nie wieder
hören werde –» (206). Faber’s characterization of these images of Sabeth
function similarly to his images of sunsets: technologically preserved forever
on film are the images of a living Sabeth – who, as fate has evidenced, is all
too mortal and no longer exists. As with the sunsets, the passing of time is
arrested through the cinematographic image. It is precisely these representa-
tions of temporal disruption — of past images in present time — that cause
Faber to abruptly leave his films and Düsseldorf, lamenting: «Ihre zwei
Hände, die es nirgends mehr gibt, [...] ihre Zähne, ihre Lippen, ihre Augen,
die es nirgends mehr gibt, ihre Stirn: wo soll ich sie suchen?» (209). 
Faber seems determined to avoid death and life at all costs, attempting to
reach his goal by ignoring time. His attraction (post-Hanna) to exclusively
younger women exemplifies this. Although Sabeth is, of course, the most
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obvious example, Ivy, too, is more than twenty years younger than Faber, and
even Faber’s subtle flirtation with the stewardess is coupled with the remark
that the woman was young enough to be his daughter (20). However, as Han-
na reminds him (as paraphrased by Faber), his attempts at thus avoiding time
are not entirely successful: «Mein Irrtum mit Sabeth: Repetition, ich habe
mich so verhalten, als gebe es kein Alter, daher widernatürlich. Wir können
nicht das Alter aufheben, indem wir weiter addieren, indem wir unsere eige-
nen Kinder heiraten» (184). There are portents throughout the novel that
imply that no matter how hard Faber tries, his attempts at avoiding the pas-
sage of time, and eventual death, by transforming time into space are for
naught – Faber fears he is running out of time, and must learn to face his own
mortality. 
The novel itself appears to be partially motivated by Faber’s fear of death:
the opportunity to write the narration is afforded by Faber’s stay in the hos-
pital in Athens, where he hopes to finally find out what is wrong with his
stomach. Faber is convinced that the diagnosis will be certain death — at the
end of the novel, he writes: «Ich habe noch keine Minute geschlafen und will
auch nicht. Ich weiß alles. Morgen werden sie mich aufmachen, um
festzustellen, was sie schon wissen: daß nichts mehr zu retten ist» (215). His
repeated reference to his stomach pains throughout the novel, coupled with
his resistance to having his maladies diagnosed by a doctor, suggest that he
is indeed afraid that his suspicious pains indicate imminent death. Further-
more, the novel not only ends with suggestions of Faber’s encroaching death,
there are also subtle allusions to Faber’s increasingly apparent mortality
throughout the novel, particularly at the beginning. The first page describes
Faber as «todmüde» (7), and as he looks in the mirror, before his collapse at
the airport, he describes his reflection as «Scheußlich wie eine Leiche» (11).
He metaphorically describes the desert as a «Totenreich» (26), though he
qualifies this remark by insisting that he, as a Techniker, sees things as they
are: naturally does not as a realm of the dead, but only as a desert. 
Herein lies the central conflict of the novel: how does a person like Faber,
who «has no relationship to time», as Hanna would say, face his own mortal-
ity – his human nature as a finite being subject to the passage of time? In
order to face death, all Faber must do is learn to face time. But, how does
Faber, a man who has learned – through various sophisticated means – to
immediately transform time into space, learn to live with time as time? How
does Faber learn to understand «Leben als Gestalt in der Zeit»? The answer
in the framework of this novel is that Faber must give birth to himself in time
– or rather, Faber must give birth to time. And, in order to give birth to time,
one must return to the mythological origins of time: to reinvent time, one
must return to Eden. Two major turning-points of the novel – the plane crash
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that first gives Faber the opportunity to revisit his past through his acquain-
tance with Herbert, and the events surrounding Sabeth’s death, which lead
him to the discovery of himself as human in the second part of the novel –
both revolve around a series of «falls». This paper will investigate Faber’s
reconciliation with time, and thus with life and death, through analyzing these
two complexes of «falls» in reference to the Biblical «fall» of Adam, and as
a commentary on the nature of time in the novel. 
The novel begins with time problems – specifically with delays. In fact,
the first sentence of the novel punctuates this fact: «Wir starteten in La
Guardia, New York, mit dreistündiger Verspätung infolge Schneestürmen»
(7). This is not where the initial time problems end. The novel proceeds with
a series of waiting: the plane and its passengers wait forty minutes on the run-
way for takeoff. In Houston, everyone except Faber waits twenty minutes for
refueling – Faber escapes the waiting game by passing out in the airport lava-
tory, which in turn causes the rest of the plane to wait for a tardy Faber. Faber
cannot stand the fact that others are waiting for him: «ich hielt sie nicht aus,
diese Warterei auf meine Person» (13), perhaps suggesting that his life has an
intimate relation to time after all, and decides to (unknowingly) cheat fate by
allowing the plane to fly on without him. His plans are, however, foiled by
the stewardess, who finds him, exclaiming: «We’re late, Mister Faber, we’re
late!» (14). He follows her to the plane, excusing himself for causing the
delay: «Ich sagte, meine Uhr sei stehengeblieben, und zog meine Uhr auf»
(15). 
This series of temporal moments, suspended in waiting, which occur right
before the accident, and Faber winding his watch are related: the symbolic act
of winding the «stehengebliebene» watch, and the temporal suspension
implied by «waiting» foreshadow the fact that in a few hours, time will stand
still. A series of «falls» will land Faber in a pre-historic landscape, where
time is transformed from a linear, finite, structure into a circular, conflated,
«pre-historic» temporality. 
This altered temporality is inaugurated by a complex of «falls» or, rather,
as Faber calls it, a «Kette von Zufällen» (23). This extraordinary chain of
events begins with the «fall» of the plane, constituting the «Unfall». Follow-
ing the crash, Faber learns of the «Zufall» that the annoying German, Her-
bert, who was seated next to him on the plane, is Hanna’s one time brother-
in-law. As even the skeptical Faber admits: «Ohne die Notlandung in
Tamaulipas (26. III) wäre alles anders gekommen; ich hätte diesen jungen
Hencke nicht kennengelernt, ich hätte vielleicht nie wieder von Hanna
gehört, ich wüßte heute noch nicht, daß ich Vater bin» (23). It is emphasized
that this series of «falls» is related to temporality: the first thing Faber does
after the emergency landing is wind his watch – again, and he later remarks
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that it is «eigentlich ein Skandal, daß die zweiundvierzig Passagiere und fünf
Leute der Besatzung nicht längst aus dieser Wüste befreit waren, schließlich
reisten die meisten von uns in dringenden Geschäften» (34). Faber is desper-
ately trying to maintain his definition of time as an object – as a business
tool. Winding his watch is an action that insists that hours and minutes have
some meaning in the desert. His claim that it is scandalous that they have not
yet been rescued rests solely on the importance of time in the business prac-
tices of those stranded. Time, for Faber, is a business commodity to be used,
spent, bought – he, at this point, has no understanding of time as a dimension
upon which his very life is dependent. 
However, the desert offers a turning point on this account – there are
signs that Faber is slowly learning that time cannot be controlled as a busi-
ness tool. Without electricity, Faber must break his compulsive shaving habit
– thus displaying the passage of time on his face. Though he complains that
for the 85 hours spent in the desert «es blieb uns nichts als Warten» (24), in
contrast with his impatience en route, he seems strangely content with this
fact – playing chess and chatting with Herbert to pass the time. In any case,
the fact that, after they are rescued, he chooses to spend several weeks with
Herbert drinking beer and laying in a hammock in the jungle – on a wild
goose chase to find a friend he hasn’t seen in twenty years – clearly demon-
strates that time has attained new meaning for Faber. As he repeatedly clari-
fies, such behavior, and usage of time, is utterly inconsistent with the serious
engineer he generally considers himself to be. 
The temporal transformation that Faber begins to experience is mirrored
by his description of the desert landscape:
Ich sehe die gezackten Felsen, schwarz vor dem Schein des Mon-
des; sie sehen aus, mag sein, wie die gezackten Rücken von
urweltlichen Tieren, aber ich weiß: Es sind Felsen [...] Es gibt keine
urweltlichen Tiere mehr. [...] Ich sehe auch keine versteinerten Engel
[...] auch keine Dämonen, ich sehe, was ich sehe: die üblichen Formen
der Erosion, [...] aber keine Gespenster. [...] Ich sehe auch kein Sintflut,
sondern Sand [...]. Ich weiß nicht, wie verdammte Seelen aussehen;
vielleicht wie schwarze Agaven in der nächtlichen Wüste. [...] Ferner
weiß ich, daß ich nicht (wenn es im Augenblick auch so aussieht) der
erste oder letzte Mensch auf der Erde bin [...]; wir stehen nicht in einem
Totenreich, sondern in der Wüste von Tamaulipas, Mexico [...] Ein
Flugzeug ist für mich ein Flugzeug, ich sehe keinen ausgestorbenen
Vogel dabei [...] Ich kann mich auch nicht entschließen, etwas wie die
Ewigkeit zu hören [...] Ende der Welt, wieso? Ich kann mir keinen
Unsinn einbilden, bloß um etwas zu erleben. [...] und ich sehe nicht ein,
wieso dort, Richtung Tampico, das Jenseits beginnen soll. (25-26).
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Interestingly, this diatribe appears to function far more to reassure Faber
that his surroundings are natural, rather than as a ploy to convince Herbert
that he need not characterize these perfectly natural surroundings as an
«Erlebnis». After all, Faber is not responding to fantastic similes that Herbert
has suggested – the metaphorical language he uses to describe the desert
landscape is composed by Faber himself. Why must Faber go on for a page
and a half to make his point? Perhaps it is because all these similes express a
common thread: without exception, each of the fantastic similes Faber invents
suggests a disruption of temporality. «Urweltliche Tiere» are pre-historic;
«Engel», «Gespenster», «verdammte Seele», «ausgestorbener Vogel» (i.e.,
Phoenix) all express immortal beings – beings that exist after death, and thus
out of time; «Totenreich», «Ewigkeit», «Jenseits», all express a realm beyond
time; the «Sintflut» signifies both a death and rebirth of the world; and «Ende
der Welt» designates the end of the world – the end of a (mortal) temporal
order. Though Faber insists that these fantastic comparisons do not express
the reality of the scenario, it is as if he might be protesting a bit much2. What
these similes do suggest is that in falling from the air, the plane has thrown
Faber into a realm where everything is somehow out of time – Faber has
metaphorically fallen into Eden, where linear time has no meaning – time has
become eternal, circular. This interpretation is supported by Faber’s further
travels. The desert, as pre-historic time, produces in Faber’s subsequent trav-
els a conflated, circular temporality – in contrast to the linear temporality of
history – wherein Faber jumps between spaces of primitivity and modernity,
birth and death. 
Faber moves from the barren desert directly to the fertile jungle, which –
in contrast to the atemporality of the desert – Faber characterizes as a thor-
oughly primitive place. As Faber arrives in Palenque, he remarks that he felt
as if he were «am Ende der Welt, mindestens am Ende der Zivilisation» (39).
Marcel, who tries to convince Faber how advanced Mayan culture was, fails
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2 At critical moments, Faber often insists that something is not the case in an attempt to
disguise what he fears is precisely true. One example: when Faber is trying to convince him-
self that the extraordinary chain of events, associated with the crash – which would make even
the most dedicated skeptic a believer in fate – can be deduced from the laws of probability. He
concludes: «Es war mehr als ein Zufall, daß alles so gekommen ist, es war eine ganze Kette
von Zufällen. Aber wieso Fügung? Ich brauche, um das Unwahrscheinliche als Erfahrungstat-
sache gelten zu lassen, keinerlei Mystik; Mathematik genügt mir» (23). He then goes on to
describe the laws of probability themselves and cite a few relevant academic texts, as if he,
himself, were not convinced by his own rationalization. Faber will go to any extremes to pre-
serve his world-view and deny the possibility of any super-scientific phenomena. Another
example is his insistence, regarding Sabeth’s accident: «was den Unfall betrifft, habe ich nichts
zu verheimlichen» (169). 
at his attemps: Faber remarks, «weil ich für Sachlichkeit bin, finde ich ja
diese Ruinen sehr primitiv [...] gerade weil sie keinerlei Technik hatten, dafür
Götter (47). However, primitivity is not the only temporal marker carried by
the jungle: Faber repeatedly refers to the jungle as a space of birth. He
describes the jungle as «schleimig», which, perhaps wouldn’t be striking were
it not for the context of several other similar descriptions. After they cremate
Joachim, Faber notes:
Wir hätten Joachim (so denke ich oft) nicht in die Erde begraben,
sondern verbrennen sollen. [...] Erde ist Schlamm nach einem einzigen
Gewitter (wie wir’s auf unsrer Rückfahrt erlebt haben), Verwesung
voller Keime, glitschig wie Vaseline, Tümpel im Morgenrot wie Tüm-
pel von schmutzigem Blut, Monatsblut, Tümpel voller Molche, nichts
als schwarze Köpfe voller Molche, nichts als schwarze Köpfe mit
zuckenden Schwänzchen wie ein Gewimmel von Spermatozoen, genau
so – grauenhaft. (73-74)
One wouldn’t necessarily have to read this citation as indicating birth.
However, it seems to suggest this. Following this description, he character-
izes himself, Herbert, and Marcel as «schmierig wie Neugeborene» after
the rain. On the next page he recalls what Marcel once said: «Tu sais que
la mort est femme! [...] et que la terre est femme!» (75). This slimy, femi-
nine earth enriched with spermatozoan salamanders certainly portrays this
land as womblike. Concerning salamanders, he mentions elsewhere: «[...]
ein Gewimmel von Molchen – überhaupt diese Fortpflanzerei überall, es
stinkt nach Fruchtbarkeit, nach blühender Verwesung. / Wo man hinspuckt,
keimt es» (55). The repeated mention of salamanders could certainly indi-
cate that they were, indeed, everywhere. However, it is not likely accidental
that he chose to use the salamander – a well-known symbol of spontaneous
generation – to describe this teeming landscape of life. That the jungle can
be read as a realm of life and reproduction is supported by his description
of the native women, who «kommen nicht aus dem Gebären heraus, scheint
es» (182). Nevertheless, though the topos of birth reigns supreme in the
jungle, birth is here also conflated with death, connoting the conflated tem-
poral status of the jungle. Faber describes the jungle as the «Ende der
Welt». Though he intends it as a description of location, it is a repetition of
the temporal signifier used to describe the desert landscape. Furthermore,
Marcel’s quote, in which he describes the earth as feminine also identifies
death as similarly feminine — and one must not forget that the description
of the jungle as a space of birth is inspired by Joachim’s death and burial.
The womb of the earth also serves as Joachim’s tomb3. In the jungle,
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«Fruchtbarkeit» and «Verwesung» are scarcely distinguishable from each
other, and perhaps the only symbol more plentiful than the salamander is
the ubiquitous vulture, constantly hovering above, waiting to sustain his
own life with the ever-imminent death of others. 
In contrast to this land of primitivity and birth is Faber’s next stop, New
York City, that perennially ultra-modern city, whose architecture Faber char-
acterizes as marking death: «die Wolkenkratzer wie Grabsteine (das habe ich
schon immer gefunden)» (176). At the party he organizes right before he
leaves, Faber complains to the party-goers: «In eurer Gesellschaft könnte man
sterben [...], man könnte sterben, ohne daß ihr es merkt [...], wozu diese
ganze Gesellschaft, wenn einer sterben könnte, ohne daß ihr es merkt» (72).
However, though New York is primarily characterized by death, New York is
also gilded with accents of birth. As Faber waits, contemplating his impend-
ing cruise to Paris, he remarks: «[...] ich freute mich aufs Leben wie ein
Jüngling, [...], ich hatte das Gefühl, ein neues Leben zu beginnen [...]» (69).
New York, like the Jungle, embodies a conflation of birth and death – thus
suggesting a conflated, non-linear temporal status. However, in the jungle, it
is birth that reigns supreme – bearing only undercurrents of death – while
ultra-modern New York is primarily characterized as a space of death and
alienation, revealing the hope of birth like a silver lining. 
The atemporal landscape of the desert and the subtle temporal conflation
implied by Faber’s travels to the jungle and New York prepare him for the
ultimate temporal taboo – an incestuous relationship with his daughter. When
he meets Sabeth, Faber no longer needs to travel through spaces of temporal
conflation – like the desert, the jungle, and New York – because this structure
of time is optimally embodied in the figure of Sabeth. Since he learns of the
significant role he played in Sabeth’s birth, only through her death, the con-
flation of birth and death is manifested by Sabeth herself. Clearly, their inces-
tuous relationship is a temporal taboo – it unifies two distinct generations.
Additionally, the novel explicitly charaterizes their relationship as such, as
Hanna reminds Faber near the end of the novel: «Wir können nicht das Alter
aufheben, indem wir weiter addieren, indem wir unsere eigenen Kinder
heiraten» (185). However, their relationship is not characterized as simply
incestuous; rather, it is innocent, unknown, fated – in other words, Oedipal. 
One hardly needs to argue this point: the novel goes through great pains
to ensure that the reader will recognize this allusion. The novel’s repeated ref-
erences to Faber’s metaphorical blindness (i. e., 200, 156, 120) – connoting
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3 Freud also aligns birth and death by attributing the uncanny fear of being buried alive
to the fantasy of living in the mother’s womb (Das Unheimliche 257). 
the fate of Oedipus – are bolstered by references to «Blinddarm» operations
(107, 116), a sudden onset of foot pain after Sabeth’s accident, recalling the
Oedipal «club-foot», and a seemingly arbitrary mention of «Oedipus und die
Sphinx, auf einer kaputten Vase dargestellt in kindlicher Weise» (154) as an
example of what, by Hanna, is treated as empirical fact. If these not-so-sub-
tle suggestions weren’t enough, on his way to Zürich, Faber repeats, in fanta-
sy, the conclusion to the Oedipus myth: «Ich sitze im Speisewagen und
denke: Warum nicht diese zwei Gabeln nehmen, sie aufrichten in meinen
Fäusten und mein Gesicht fallen lassen, um die Augen loszuwerden?» (209).
It is significant that this relationship is clearly characterized as Oedipal,
because it reveals the relationship itself as a temporal conflation. As Oedipus
meets the Spinx, he is faced with the riddle: «What animal is it that in the
morning goes on four feet, at noon on two, and in the evening upon three?»
(Gayley 262). The Oedipus myth embodies a circular, conflated temporal
structure, because the solution to this riddle demands the conflation of three
time periods – morning, noon, and evening. Thus, in marking the relationship
as Oedipal, the Sphinx’s riddle further characterizes Sabeth and Faber’s rela-
tionship as a symbol of temporal conflation. In a stroke of irony, a possible
etymology of the name «Oedipus» – «I know» (oida) «the two-footer»
(dipous) – indicates precisely that two-footed being that Faber does not know:
man as a mortal being. 
Though Oedipus is certainly suggested by the repeated references to
blindness, and by allusions throughout the novel to Greek mythology and
art, one must not forget another mythological figure of blindness: the three
blind sisters of fate – particularly given the emphasis and importance of
coincidence («Zufall»), vs. fate in the novel. Faber is determined to trans-
form every apparent manifestation of fate into a simple coincidence or acci-
dent. The blind sisters of fate, in contrast to Oedipus, represent not a circu-
lar, conflated temporality, but a finite, linear temporality symbolized by the
thread of life, the severance of which spells immediate death4. Perhaps that
is why Faber goes to any extreme to reject the possibility of fate – not
because he is afraid that accepting the role of fate in his life would indicate
a belief in super-scientific powers or suggest that he is superstitious, but
rather because accepting the existence of fate would imply an acknowledg-
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4 Interestingly, Faber is not the only one to try to control time through a «text». The sis-
ters of fate also weave a «textile» of finite, linear time directly opposed to the circular, eternal
time Faber hopes to spin with his own «texts». In addition to the way in which Faber uses rep-
resentation to transform time into innocuous space, as argued in Plato’s Symposium, the very
act of creating (in the broadest sense of the word) is related to an attempt to taste immortali-
ty by leaving something of the self behind (Plato 102-106).
ment of the temporality symbolized by those blind sisters, and thus of his
own mortality and certain death. It is such a temporality – finite and linear
– which Faber cannot understand or accept; however, it is precisely the
acceptance of this structure of time, which will allow him to give birth to
himself as a human being, with a relationship to time and, thus, to death and
life. 
For a man who needs to learn about linear, finite time, the Eden-like
world into to which Faber falls is no place to be. Faber falls into «Eden» in
the first complex of falls; that is, he falls into a temporal order characterized
by conflation and circularity. During the second complex of «falls», sur-
rounding Sabeth’s death, he falls out of «Eden» and into a human, discrete,
linear temporality. This second complex of «falls» is initiated by Faber
learning of the «Zufall» that Hanna is Sabeth’s mother – and, hence, that he
could be her father. This discovery is followed by his reunion with Hanna,
made necessary by Sabeth’s «Unfall». Faber makes clear, that Sabeth’s
«Unglück» – the true, tragic accident, was not caused by the snake’s bite, but
by a «fall» from a scarp. The narration marks the importance of Sabeth’s fall
by altering how it happened, suggesting that Faber feels some guilt or
responsibility for her accident. In Faber’s first retelling of the incident, right
after his arrival in Athens, Faber claims that he finds Sabeth unconscious.
He hears her scream and sees her fall, when he arrives, she is already uncon-
scious, and it is only then that he sees the snakebite. In the second version,
which is revealed only after Hanna and Faber return to the accident site,
shortly before Sabeth’s death, Faber declares, somewhat suspiciously (see
note #1): «was den Unfall betrifft, habe ich nichts zu verheimlichen» (169),
he went swimming while she was sleeping and heard her scream. Since he
was swimming fifty meters away, it took quite a while for him to struggle
through the shallow water back to the beach where she had been sleeping.
When he arrived, she was standing on a small hill in a panic with her hand
over her heart – over the snakebite. Faber ran up the hill, naked, and, as he
tried to help her, she backed away from him, falling from the two-meter high
scarp. He finds her unconscious and then sees the snakebite, and, as in the
other version, hurries to Athens. Though it is not clear whether or not the
doctors in Athens knew about the fall, Faber does learn that Sabeth dies not
from the snakebite, which was successfully treated, but from an undiagnosed
fracture of the skull, which could have been treated by surgical intervention.
It is not clear whether Faber ever tells anyone about the fall; in any case, it
is only the snakebite that Faber or anyone else discusses as a threat to
Sabeth’s life. However, if Faber hadn’t believed that the fall was threatening,
why does he recount two versions of the story – one, in which the impor-
tance of the fall is minimized, and in which he bears no responsibility for the
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accident, and the other in which the fall is very important, and, in which he
bears full responsibility for the fall and Sabeth’s death?
The ambiguity associated with Faber’s responsibility and guilt for
Sabeth’s fall and eventual death suggests the way in which this complex of
«falls» is related to the first. These two complexes of falls: the first – sur-
rounding the «Unfall» of the plane – which begins the «Erste Station», and
the second – surrounding Sabeth’s «Unfall» – which end it, are intimately
related to temporality via the mythical structure that they recall. Both com-
plexes invoke the Biblical «Fall» of Adam, and thus relate to the origin of his-
tory, mortality, and time. The first complex lands Faber in an Eden-like tem-
poral structure – immortal, circular, pre-historical. That this first complex of
«falls» can be read as related to the Biblical fall is clarified by the second
complex of «falls», which allows Faber to fall back out of Eden into a mor-
tal, finite, temporal structure. In the second complex of falls, the importance
of the «fall» is intensified by the importance of Sabeth’s fall – it was the fall,
not the snakebite that killed her – and by the ambiguity associated with
Faber’s guilt for the fall. In the first version of the story, he bears no respon-
sibility for the fall, in the second, he bears primary responsibility for it. Thus
Adam’s fall is here replayed through the linking of central motifs surround-
ing the Biblical fall: «the fall», «guilt», and «death». However, if this were
not enough to recall the Biblical fall here, the Eden-like setting, the naked
Faber, and the snake encroaching on paradise, sufficiently justify the validity
of reading a Biblical cross-reference into this complex of falls. 
The thesis, that these two complexes of falls result in a personal tempo-
ral transformation for Walter Faber is actualized following Sabeth’s death in
the «Second Station» of the novel. The second part of the novel is, in some
ways, a repetition of the first: Faber revisits many of the locations from the
first part of the novel – New York, the jungle. However, the second part of
the novel is distinctly different from the first: instead of a tourist passing
through different locales and different temporal structures, the second part of
the novel reveals a Walter Faber on a highly personal, emotional journey on
the linear, finite path from Sabeth’s death in Athens, full circle to his own (at
least feared) death in Athens. In other words, in the «Second Station» of the
novel, Faber is liberated from a conflated, objectified temporality and allowed
to give birth to himself as a feeling, mortal being, on a linear, finite tempo-
ral path towards his own death. 
In contrast to the first part of the novel, Faber’s experience in each of the
locales he visits is imbued with a highly emotional tone. Following Sabeth’s
death, he is first faced with his own existential crisis in that city of death:
New York. He tries to reach his own home, only to find that he has been
usurped by another. Faber’s distrust of his own identity is clearly questioned
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when he, Walter Faber, asks the new resident, «Are you Walter Faber?» (178).
From New York, he returns to the jungle to see Herbert. Though in the jun-
gle, he finds «alles unverändert», Faber is himself different. Instead of a inex-
plicable curiosity that led him to the jungle, Faber’s purpose for visiting
(though inexplicable to Herbert) is simply, «bloß um ihn [Herbert]
wiederzusehen [...] man hat nicht soviel Freunde» (181). From the jungle, the
land of birth, Faber proceeds to Cuba, which is repeatedly characterized as a
land of youth: the pimps are constantly advertising their wares to Faber by
gushing: «Something very beautiful! D’you know what I mean? Something
very young!» (187, 197), and in Cuba, Faber is generally assumed to be
American, which gives him pause to think about «The American Way of
Life», which is characterized by a false, obscene youthfulness. What is, how-
ever, more striking about Cuba, is that, in opposition to the hardened scien-
tist Faber, we find here, for the first time, an explicitly emotional Faber – a
Faber who cries (191), repeatedly states his happiness (195, 196, 197), and
even, at one point, exclaims to himself: «Ich preise das Leben» (197). 
After leaving the land of apparent youth, Faber stops briefly in Düsseldorf
to carry out an unrequested «Freundenpflicht» by showing the executives of
Herbert’s firm his films of Guatamala, then proceeds to the city of his literal
youth and origin: Zürich. He admits that the purpose of his trip was to satis-
fy an emotional need: «Ich fuhr von Düsseldorf nach Zürich, glaube ich, bloß
weil ich meine Vaterstadt seit Jahrzehnten nicht mehr gesehen habe. Ich hat-
te in Zürich nichts zu tun» (209). In the city of his birth he is greeted by a
premonition of death in the flesh, Professor O., whom he must resist asking:
«wann er denn sterbe» (210). He returns from this specter of death in Zürich
to, what he believes will be his final resting place, Athens. At midnight, cus-
ping the last day of the novel he writes: «Ich weiß alles. Morgen werden sie
mich aufmachen, um festzustellen, was sie schon wissen: daß nichts mehr zu
retten ist» (215). 
This second travelogue, of the «Second Station» reveals a Faber who is
not traveling through temporally conflated locales, but is traveling the course
of his own life: from (Sabeth’s) death, via Athens and New York, to birth via
the jungle, youth via Cuba and Zürich, and finally to his own death in Athens.
Two travelogues, two stations of the novel. This novel is seemingly full of
twos. There are two complexes of falls, two mythologies (Judeo-Christian and
Greek) referred to, two models of temporality – symbolized respectively by
Oedipus and the blind sisters of fate, and two Walter Fabers. The novel ends
with Faber writing (unfortunately in his own handwriting, they have taken his
«Hermes-baby»), which returns us to the topic of «two», which began this
paper: re-presentation. Representation plays such an important role through-
out this novel, because it suspends time in space: as long as time is locked up
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within a representation, it can have no effect on Faber’s life and he cannot be
compelled to face his own mortality. However, at the end, representation has
been stripped of its role as a time-keeper. The two complexes of «falls»,
which constitute the two critical turning points of this novel – the plane crash
in Tamaulipas, and Sabeth’s accident and death – and frame the «First Sta-
tion» of the novel, effect a temporal transformation. Time is no longer locked
within representation: the first complex of «falls» returns time to its original
status before the Adamic fall – as an eternal, circular, conflated construct,
and the second complex of «falls» restores time to its post-Eden, human sta-
tus as a linear, finite structure, and forces Faber to come to terms with his life
in a finite temporality. In other words, these two complexes of falls force
Faber to come to terms with his own imminent death. However, it is not only
his death, that Faber faces through this temporal transformation of time, it is
his life as well. After the second complex of falls, in the «Second Station» of
the novel, Faber is finally able to cry, to be happy, to experience friendship.
On the last day of the novel, Faber’s rebirth as a human being, conscious of
the finite nature of «Leben als Gestalt in der Zeit», is evident. In contrast to
that Faber who faced a plane crash with nonchalance and academic interest,
this Faber is desperate to live. That Faber, who seemed to regard human rela-
tionships as an annoying necessity, finally becomes one who understands
what it means to be human:
Ich hänge an diesem Leben wie noch nie, und wenn es nur noch
ein Jahr ist, ein elendes, ein Vierteljahr, zwei Monate (das wären Sep-
tember und Oktober), ich werde hoffen, obschon ich weiß, daß ich ver-
loren bin. Aber ich bin nicht allein, Hanna ist mein Freund, und ich bin
nicht allein (215). 
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